The Financial Crisis has accelerated the shift of economic power from West to East in many ways: one of them is that more and more cash-strained American and European companies have been looking for buyers from their counterparts in emerging economies, particularly China. Last month, Geely, a Chinese car manufacturer, set a new record by completing the acquisition of Volvo, the Swedish premium car maker, from Ford for $1.5bn. Meanwhile, the largest foreign investment in Germany’s engineering sector for years came from Sany, a Chinese industrial conglomerate. Sany will build a machinery plant near Cologne to gain access to Germany’s rich engineering skills.
For years Western media have been talking about Chinese state-owned enterprises, backed by Chinese state banks, buying strategic assets, such as minerals, oil, and gas, all over the globe. But the newest players in the merger & acquisition game come from more competitive sectors with diversified ownership. Profits from China’s booming domestic market certainly helped companies like Geely and Sany to be in the position to do the acquisitions mentioned above. Remember that not that long ago, in 2006, Sany failed in its bid for Xugong, a state-owned heavy machinery maker, in competition with Carlyle Group, the US private equity firm. This year, Sany is already the market leader in sectors such as concrete pumps, with enough confidence – and cash – to “push into Germany’s heart and soul” (Financial Times, August 11). Indeed, aided by the Chinese state’s “walking out” strategy, which plans to utilize the country’s inexhaustible foreign reserves to help make Chinese companies global players, Chinese companies are increasingly adept at obtaining technological knowledge, managerial experience, and, more recently, global brands through overseas acquisitions.
Never before in world history has a country in the process of development been so deeply involved in offshore acquisitions. East Asian economies such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan rarely engaged in outward investment at a similar stage in their development. Instead these economies confined themselves to establishing public institutions to help domestic firms to identify, import and absorb foreign technologies, as well as to nurture domestic innovative capabilities. With “walking out” through outward investment, has China discovered a new way, or even a shortcut, to technological advancement and capabilities accumulation?
So far, China’s record of using overseas acquisitions to strengthen its capabilities remains a mixed outcome. Successful stories include Lenovo’s successful integration of IBM’s personal computer business, which not only consolidated Lenovo’s position in the domestic market, but also helped the company leapfrog into being a competitive player in both US and EU market. But there are failures. The high-profile acquisition in 2006 of France’s Thomson by TCL, the world’s largest television maker at that time, turned out to be a waste of time and money. By the time TCL closed most of its facilities in Europe, it lagged behind its aggressive domestic rivals in next-generation flat screen products. Overseas acquisitions of strategic assets can accelerate enterprise growth, but these foreign acquisitions may be at the expense of investments in indigenous innovation.
Last month, China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy in the world in terms of nominal gross domestic product. But it is still too early to say that China has outperformed other East Asian developmental states in building innovative capabilities, through various policy options it experimented including outward investment. China’s GDP per capita is only 1/30 that of Japan. And more critically, when Japan achieved the position of the number two economy in the world in the late 1960s, a group of world-class companies like Toyota, Sony and Toshiba had already emerged. In climbing the technological ladder, corporate China has a long way to go.